We examine real-activity based earnings management, i.e., cuts in discretionary innovation/marketing spending and overproduction for meeting the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses across firms' life cycle. We use the cash flow components to classify a firm's life cycle. We hypothesize and find that firms in the growth and mature stages exhibit real-activity based earnings management to meet earnings target of avoiding losses; but firms in the introductory stage do not. We also hypothesize and find that such real-activity based earnings management to meet the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses is associated with future performance for mature firms, but not so for growth firms. Collectively, our evidence shows the importance of considering firm's life cycle when examining real-activity based earnings management.
Introduction
in their survey of financial executives report that roughly 80% of executives would "consider taking actions that will deliver earnings, as long as the actions are within GAAP and the real sacrifices are not too large." Consistent with this, Roychowdhury (2006) develops measures for various real-activity based earnings management and documents that firms avoid reporting losses through real-activity based earnings management. Gunny (2010) documents that firms that avoid reporting losses through real-activity earnings management are positively associated with the future operating performance, which suggests that real-activity based earnings management is not opportunistic. However, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) show that for firms with seasoned equity offerings, real-activity based earnings management is negatively associated with future operating performance; indicating that real-activity based earnings management is likely to be opportunistic. Our objective is to provide insights into whether realactivity based earnings management is opportunistic by examining real-activity based earnings management separately for the firm's life cycle. A firm's life cycle consists of the following stages: introduction, growth, maturity and decline (see Dickinson, 2011; Drake, 2015) . Spence (1977 Spence ( , 1979 Spence ( , 1981 provides insights into the activities of firms in each stage. 1 Based on the activities that firms focus on in each stage, i.e., the supply-side, we argue that firms in the introduction stage are not likely to engage in realactivities based earnings management to avoid reporting losses because they are not likely to have much discretion over their spending so as to engage in discretionary cuts to their innovation 1 Gort and Klepper (1982) characterize these stages for the industry's life cycle and Jovanovic (1982) develops arguments about the firms' activities in the industry's life cycle. The decline stage includes firms in the shake-out stage as well as the decline stage. We combine the shake-out and decline stages because our focus is on the introductory, growth and mature stage firms.
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Page No. 4 and marketing spending. On the demand-side as well, the providers of capital are likely to expect firms in the introduction stage to report losses, i.e., the burn rate, which likely dampens the incentive to engage in real-activities based earnings management to achieve earnings benchmarks. However, firms in the growth and mature stages are likely to have the ability and the incentive to engage in real-activities based earnings management to achieve earnings benchmarks. We thus hypothesize that firms in the introduction stage are not likely to engage in real-activities based earnings management to avoid reporting losses; and firms in the growth and mature stages are likely to engage in real-activity based earnings management to achieve earnings benchmark. We also hypothesize that if firms in the growth and mature stages are efficient (opportunistic) in cutting discretionary expenses then these firms that engage in realactivity based earnings management to avoid reporting losses will be positively (negatively) associated with future operating performance. We find that for firms in the growth and mature stages real-activity based earnings management is positively associated with just meeting the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses; and for firms in the introductory stage real-activity based earnings management is not associated with just meeting the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses. These results support the hypothesis that firms in the growth and mature stages are the ones with both the discretion and incentives to engage in real-activity based earnings management to attain earnings benchmarks.
We find that firms in the growth and mature stages that engage in real-activity based earnings management to just meet the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses exhibit better industry-adjusted return on assets in the subsequent year compared to the growth and mature stage firms that do not engage in such real-activity based earnings management; albeit weakly so for growth firms. To examine the weak result with respect to the firms in the growth stage, we examine the future performance using one-year ahead industry-adjusted cash flow from operations and cumulative three years' industry-adjusted return on assets. We find that for both growth and mature stage firms real-activity based earnings management to just meet the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses is positively associated with next year's cash flow from operations. However, when we consider the cumulative three-year ahead industry-adjusted return on assets to account for the long-term performance consequences of the discretionary spending cuts, we find that for firms in the mature stage real-activity based earnings management to just
Page No. 6 meet the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses is positively associated with better future performance, but it is not so for growth firms. This indicates that real-activity based earnings management is structural for mature firms, and thus efficient; while for growth firms the realactivity based earnings management may not be so. 2 Even though growth firms are more likely to raise capital, and thus have stronger incentives to meet earnings targets, we explore the incentive effect more directly by examining the firms' merger and acquisition activity and equity capital raising activity. We classify firms that have had a merger or raised capital in the year as the ones with incentives to engage in realactivity based earnings management. Here again we find that while firms in both the growth and mature stages exhibit real-activity based earnings management, compared to firms without incentives the result is stronger for firms with incentives. In addition, among the firms with stronger incentives to meet earnings benchmarks, real-activity based earnings management to meet earnings benchmark is positively associated with one-year ahead industry-adjusted return on assets for both firms in growth and mature firms; and similar to earlier results weakly so for growth firms. Among the firms with less stronger incentives to meet earnings benchmarks, realactivity based earnings management to meet earnings benchmark is positively associated with one-year ahead industry-adjusted return on assets only for the mature firms.
Collectively, these findings suggest that both Gunny's (2010) Even though conceptually real-activity based earnings management is likely to be related to the firm's life cycle, the cash flow components that we use to classify the firm's life cycle could be cause for concern for two reasons. First, the cash flow from operations is a performance measure that is also potentially managed by the firm. Lee (2012) documents evidence consistent with the notion that firms manage cash flow from operations upwards, by shifting between cash flow components and/or changing the timing of the payment/receipt. As such, a firm that is in the introductory stage could be misclassified as being in the growth or mature stage. Such misclassifications of the life cycle would render cash flow components as a proxy for the life cycle stage to be noisy, and bias against finding support for our hypotheses. Second, the cutting of discretionary spending for marketing and innovation activities is likely to directly increase the cash flow from operations. This mechanical relationship could in turn shift the firm's life cycle classification to growth and/or mature firms -firms with positive cash flow from operations. To address these concerns we drop firms with small positive cash flow from operations and find similar results.
In other robustness tests, first we consider the performance matched real-activity based earnings management measure as proposed by Cohen et al. (2015) noting that such adjustment for performance is likely to make the relationship of real-activity based earnings management more tenuous. We find that firms in any of the stages do not engage in real-activity based showing that firms in the mature stage and not firms in the introductory and growth stages that engage in real-activity based earnings management to just meet the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses exhibit better industry-adjusted return on assets in the next year. Lastly, our results are consistent with the notion expressed in the survey of Graham et al. (2005) that managers would consider real-activity based earnings management only if the sacrifice, i.e., the cost is not too much; the sacrifice for the introductory stage firms are likely to be very high. As such, real-activity decisions are likely to be more structural and not opportunistic.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the background literature and the empirical expectations. Section 3 contains the research design and variable definitions.
Section 4 contains the empirical analysis, and Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
Background Literature, Empirical Expectations and Research Design

Background Literature
This paper builds upon two streams of literature: real-activity based earning management literature and the firm life cycle literature. Accordingly, we provide the background literature pertaining to both these streams below.
Real-activity based Earnings Management
Prior research documents that managers cut discretionary spending to attain earnings targets. The accounting rules require that innovation, marketing and human resource benchmarks exhibit better future performance. She documents that firms that avoid reporting losses through real-activity earnings management are positively associated with the future operating performance, which suggests that real-activity based earnings management is not opportunistic. As such, while prior research shows that cutting spending on innovation, marketing and human resource development are positively associated with attaining earning benchmarks, the evidence on whether these actions lead to better or worse future performance is mixed. Accordingly, the objective of this study is to examine the incidence of real-activity based earnings management and its relationship with future performance for different stages of the firm's life cycle.
Firm's Life Cycle
Dickinson (2011) 
Development of Empirical Expectations
Real-activity Based Earnings Management to Avoid Losses
Firms in the introductory or start-up stage are likely to make heavy investments in innovation and marketing activities, compared to their market share or sales, so as to create market acceptance (Bain, 1956; Caves, 1972; Scherer, 1970) . These investments are considered as expenses and form part of the operating cash flow. Firms in the growth stage attain a certain degree of foothold in the market and continue to make heavy investments in innovation, market branding as well as equipment so as to grow their market share (Bain, 1956; Caves, 1972; Scherer, 1970) . Firms in the mature stage direct their attention to improve efficiency, and generate profits/returns to providers of capital (Selling and Stickney, 1989) . Firms in the decline stage are likely in that situation because of technological disruptions (Christensen, 2003) , and thus engage in disinvestments and restructuring activities (Kimberly, 1980; Miller and Friesen, 1984; Quinn and Cameron, 1983) .
Firms in the introductory stage are not likely to use real-activity based earnings management for two reasons. First, on the demand-side investors are not likely to focus on shortterm earnings as much as the investments in innovation and market branding activities. As such,
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Page No. 14 managers are not likely to have the pressure of reporting profits. 4 It follows that for firms in the introductory stage the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses may not be relevant. Second, on the supply-side firms in an introductory stage are not likely to cut spending on innovation or marketing activities or overproduce to meet earnings targets because the discretionary portion of such expenditures may be minimal, if not non-existent for these capital strapped firms (see Knott and Posen, 2005) . Consistent with this notion, studies document that firms in the introductory stage or entrepreneurial firms, operate with investments at a minimum level (for example see Castanias and Helfat, 2001 ). Overall, the innovation and marketing expenditures for firms in the introductory stage are necessary and form the building blocks for the future prospects of the company. As such, these firms are not likely to have discretion to cut these spending.
Firms in the growth stage are likely to use real-activity earnings management to meet earnings benchmarks, because they are likely to need external/internal financing to expand operations (Jovanovic, 1982) . Furthermore, the founders of companies are likely to exit, i.e., cash out during the growth stage (Amit et al., 1998; Granlund and Taipaleenmaki, 2005) . In a similar vein, firms in the mature stage are likely to face capital market pressure to meet earnings targets (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). 5 These demand-side factors are likely to provide incentives for managers to engage in real-activity based earnings management for both growth and mature firms. On the supply-side, firms in growth and mature stages are likely to have the discretion to disinvest from unproductive innovations and marketing activities because they are likely to have a portfolio of projects -of which some are not so promising (Hamilton and Chow, 1993; Hitt et 4 Graham et al. (2005) surveyed the large companies that are more likely to be in the mature stage. 5 Even though Burstahler and Dichev (1997) do not explicitly consider the life cycle stages, the examples and arguments are premised on steady state, i.e., mature companies.
Page No. 15 al., 1996; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994) ; or delay investments in new innovation and marketing projects (Hitt et al., 1996) . The combination of the discretion as well as the incentive to meet earnings benchmarks is likely to make firms in growth and mature stages engage in real-activity based earnings management. These arguments lead us to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis H1
H1a: Firms in the growth and mature stages that just meet the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses exhibit real-activity based earnings management.
H1b: Firms in the introductory stage that just meet the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses do not exhibit real-activity based earnings management.
Collectively, Hypotheses H1a and H1b posit that Roychowdhury's (2006) spending on innovation and marketing activities (for example, see Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001 ).
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In effect, it will not be possible to disentangle disinvestments from real-activity based earnings management; and accordingly we do not hypothesize real-activity based earnings management for firms in the decline stage; however, we provide the empirical results for decline firms for purpose of reference.
Future Performance and Real-activity Based Earnings Management to Avoid Losses
Following Gunny (2010) given the existence of real-activity based earnings management for the growth and mature stages, we examine whether these cuts in discretionary spending are opportunistic by examining subsequent performance. On the one hand, if these cuts are opportunistic then we expect firms that just meet earnings benchmark of avoiding losses through cuts in spending to be negatively associated with future performance (see for example Matsunaga and Park, 2001 ). On the other hand, if these cuts are not opportunistic then we expect firms that just meet earnings benchmark of avoiding losses through cuts in spending to be positively associated with future performance. Bartov et al. (2002) show that firms that just meet earnings benchmarks are associated with future operating performance and suggest that meeting benchmarks increases the credibility of the firm and avoids litigation. Furthermore, meeting such benchmarks provides a signal of managerial competence. Consistent with the latter arguments, Gunny (2010) finds that firms that just meet earnings benchmark of avoiding losses through cuts in spending are positively associated with future performance. 6 The repositioning of the US automobile manufacturers in light of the Japanese automobile manufacturer's quality and production practices in the late 1980s and early 1990s provides a good example. General Motors entered into a joint venture with Toyota to manufacture automobiles to learn the lean manufacturing practices -the Nummi plant, and closed many of the then existing plants (see Gomes-Casseres, 2009 ). General Motors engaged in both heavy investments as well as disinvestments during this period, which would have been classified as a decline stage in our classification.
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Page No. 17 Firms in the growth stage are likely to have more incentives to meet the earnings target of avoiding losses because of their need to raise capital to support growth. While this argument is similar to the Cohen and Zarowin's (2010) argument of incentives to engage in real-activity based earnings management, the life cycle stage is an ex ante measure of the potential for requiring capital. In this sense, the results are not likely to be driven by selection issues.
Collectively, these arguments lead us to propose the following hypothesis. 
Research Design and Variable Definitions
Earnings Bins
We consider four earnings bins based on the net income scaled by total assets: (a) firms that missed the benchmark, (b) firms that just missed the benchmark, (b) firms that just beat the benchmark, and (d) firms that beat the benchmark. Specifically, we classify firm-years with net income between zero and one percent of total assets as firms that just meet the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses, i.e., if NI t /ASSET t is between zero and 0.01, J_BEAT=1, otherwise J_BEAT=0. We classify firm-years with net income between zero and negative one percent of total assets as firms that just missed the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses, i.e., if NI t /ASSET t is between zero and -0.01, J_MISS=1, otherwise J_MISS=0. We classify firm-years with net income greater than or equal to one percent of total assets as firms that beat the earnings 7 Dickinson (2011) separates our decline stage classification into shake-out and decline stages. In unreported analysis we separate our decline stages into the two categories and find similar results. We choose to combine these stages because both these stages will be engaged in disinvestments, and as such for our test it is appropriate to combine these stages.
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Page No. 19 benchmark of avoiding losses, i.e., if NI t /ASSET t is greater than or equal to 0.01, BEAT=1, otherwise BEAT=0. We classify firm-years with net income less than negative one percent of total assets as firms that missed the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses, i.e., if NI t /ASSET t is less than 0.01, MISS=1, otherwise MISS=0.
Real-activity based Earnings Management
Following Gunny (2010) where RD is the research and development expense, SGA is the selling, general and administrative expense, PROD is the production expense computed as the cost of goods sold plus the change in inventory, ASSET is the total assets, MKT_VAL is the market capitalization computed as common shares outstanding multiplied by the fiscal-year end stock price; TOBIN's_Q is the sum of market value of equity, preferred stock, long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the total assets; INT is internal funds computed as the sum of income before extraordinary items, depreciation and research and development expenses; SALE (1a), (1b) and (1c), respectively. Our measure for realactivity based earnings management is AB_RM = AB_RD + AB_SGA -AB_PROD.
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All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A, and the results of estimating equation (1) are provided in the Appendix B.
Research Design
To test Hypothesis H1, we modify Roychowdhury's (2006) and Gunny's (2010) 
where J_BEAT is one if net income over total assets is between zero and 0.01, and zero otherwise; J_MISS is one if net income over total assets is between zero and -0.01, and zero otherwise; MISS is one if net income over total assets is less than -0.01; ASSET is the total assets; MTB is the market value of equity over book value of equity where market value of
W.P. No. 2015-12-01
Page No. 21 equity is computed as common shares outstanding multiplied by the fiscal-year end stock price;
ROA is the return on assets computed as income before extraordinary items over previous year's total assets. We estimate equation (2) for firms in each life cycle stage separately. In all of our estimations we delete observations with absolute value of student residuals greater than 3.50 to mitigate the effect of outliers on our inferences and correct the standard errors for computing tstatistics using firm and year clusters (Petersen, 2009). We also estimate equation (2) for all stages put together so as to compare our results with that of prior studies.
Equation (2) To test Hypothesis H2, we modify Gunny's (2010) ZSCORE is a measure of financial health computed using a variant of Altman's (1968) Z-Score.
We estimate equation (3) for firms in each life cycle stage separately. As with equation (2) in all of our estimations we delete observations with absolute value of student residuals greater than 3.50 to mitigate the effect of outliers on our inferences and correct the standard errors for computing t-statistics using firm and year clusters (Petersen, 2009). We also estimate equation (3) for all stages put together so as to compare our results with those of prior studies.
The test variable is RM×J_BEAT and based on hypothesis H2a and H2b we expect that the coefficient estimate, β 5 for Mature firms to be positive, and that for Intro, Growth and Decline firms to be non-positive. Equation (3) (2006) and Gunny (2010) . The results support Hypothesis H1a and H1b. Furthermore, as noted earlier the coefficient estimate on J_BEAT is biased upwards for all stages because the propensity to engage in real-activity based earnings management is not randomly distributed across the other three earnings bins (see Siriviriyakul, 2014).
Real-activity Earnings Management to Just Avoid Loss
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Page No. 26 Table 2 , Panel A provides the mean and median of the additional variables used in equation (3) We provide the results for firms in the Intro and Decline stages even though Hypotheses 2a and 2b do not pertain to these stages. Firms in the Intro and Decline stages that just meet the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses through real-activity based earnings management are not associated with future performance -this is consistent with the notion that the AB_RM for firms in these stages may not capture real-activity based earnings management.
Future Performance and Real-activity Earnings Management to Just Avoid Loss
The right side columns provide the results of estimating equation (3) without J_MISS and MISS as in Gunny (2010) . The results support Hypothesis H2a and H2b, the coefficient on RM×J_BEAT for the Mature stage is positive and significant, while that for Growth stage is statistically insignificant at the conventional levels.
Collectively, the evidence suggests that firms in the Growth and Mature stages exhibit real-activity based earnings management; however, for firms in the Mature stage the discretionary cuts are on average efficient.
Additional Analysis
First, following Gunny (2010) we examine future cash flow from operations as an alternative measure of future performance, because the results support Hypothesis 2b weakly.
However, it is important to note that since cash flow from operations forms a basis for the classification of life cycle stages, the results of this analysis should be interpreted with caution.
The mean (median) of cash flow from operations, CFO for Intro, Growth, Mature and Decline are -0.409, 0.128, 0.134 and -0.113 (-0.164, 0.101, 0.118 and -0.033 flows, by design. Table 3 , Panel A provides the results of estimating equation (3) using cash flow from operations instead of return on assets as the dependent variable. For sake of brevity, we do not report the coefficients on the control variables. Consistent with the results discussed in Table   2 Second, we estimate equation (3) using the cumulative industry-adjusted return on assets for next three years instead of the one-year ahead industry-adjusted return on assets. We do this because the measure of discretionary spending cuts embedded in AB_RM relate primarily to innovation and marketing activities, and such activities are likely to have a long-term consequence rather than a short-term consequence (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1982) . Table 3 ,
Panel B provides the results of estimating equation (3) Table 4 , Panel A provides the results of estimating equation (2) Table 5 provides the results of estimating equations (2) and (3) for each of the components of AB_RM i.e. AB_RD, AB_SGA and AB_PROD. For the sake of brevity, we report the coefficients and t-statistics only on the variables J_BEAT and RM×J_BEAT. Our
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Robustness Tests
Even though conceptually real-activity based earnings management is likely to be related to the firm's life cycle, the cash flow components that we use to classify the firm's life cycle could be directly related to real-activity based earnings management. In other words, one possible concern in our research design is that the cutting of discretionary spending for marketing and innovation activities is likely to directly increase the cash flow from operations.
Furthermore, Lee (2012) shows the propensity of firms to manage cash flow from operations.
These factors could in turn shift Intro or Decline stage firms to growth and/or mature firmsfirms with positive cash flow from operations. To address this we drop firms with small positive cash flows from operations. Specifically, we delete firm-year observations where the cash flows from operations is between zero and one percent of total assets and estimate equations (2) and (3) . 10 The results are reported in Table 6 . In equation (2), the coefficient estimate on J_BEAT for the Intro, Growth, Mature and Decline stages are 0.016 , -0.056, -0.042 and -0.059 (t-statistics = 0.773, -4.132, -2.924 and -3.167 ), respectively; and in equation (3) Tables 1 and 2 .
We then use the firm-specific AB_RM and match the firm based on ROA to the closest firm in the industry-year, and compute the performance matched abnormal real-activity based 10 We use one percent as the cut-off so as to be consistent with the earnings benchmark.
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Page No. 31 earnings management measure as the difference between the AB_RM and the matched firm AB_RM (see Cohen et al., 2015) . In equation (2) performance, while the firms in the other stages do not. However, the inference should be made with caution, because the estimation of equation (2) suggests no real-activity based earnings management. This non-result for Hypothesis H1 is not surprising when one notes that in separately estimating equation (2) for the life cycle stages, we match on performance -firms in each of the life cycle stages have different benchmarks that are important.
We use the Anthony and Ramesh (1992) approach to classify the firm's life cycle stages.
Specifically, each year, firms are ranked into three groups based on each of these variables: (a) dividend payout ratio, (b) sales growth, (c) capital expenditure, and (d) firm age. Firms in the lowest (highest) terciles of dividend payout ratio and firm age are ranked as one (three), and firms in the highest (lowest) terciles of sales growth and capital expenditure are ranked as one (three). We then calculate a score (sum of ranks) for each firm, ranging from four to twelve.
Firms with scores of 4 and 5 are classified as Intro; 6 and 7 as Growth; 8 to 10 as Mature; and the rest as Decline. In equation (2), the coefficient estimate on J_BEAT for the Intro, Growth,
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Mature and Decline stages are -0.204, -0.068, -0.074 and -0.084 (t-statistics = -3.515, -3.282, -8.808 and -3.014) , respectively. We find that firms in all life cycle stages exhibit real-activity based earnings management to meet the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses. In equation ( We estimate seemingly unrelated regressions to estimate equations (2) and (3) respectively. These results are consistent with those discussed in Tables 1 and 2 .
Concluding Remarks
We examine whether firms use real-activity based earnings management, i.e., cuts in discretionary spending in innovation and marketing activities, and overproduction in order to meet the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses across different life cycle stages; and whether such real-activity based earnings management to meet the earnings benchmark of avoiding losses is associated with future performance differently across the life cycle stages. We hypothesize that
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Page No. 33 firms in the introductory and decline stages are not likely to have the capacity to cut spending in a discretionary manner, and the investors also are not likely to expect such firms to meet earnings benchmarks. As such, we expect real-activity based earnings management for firms in the growth and mature stages. We find support for this hypothesis. Furthermore, we hypothesize that firms in the mature stage are likely to be using the discretionary spending cuts, efficiently such that these actions are positively related to future performance; for firms in the growth phase this may not be the case. We find support for real-activity based earnings management of firms in the mature stage being positively associated with future performance; and weakly so for growth firms. We thus find support for the measures of real-activity based earnings management, as well as the support for such earnings management being opportunistic especially for growth firms. Future research should consider controlling for the firm life cycle stages before drawing conclusions about real-activity based earnings management. 
Appendix A Variable definitions
AB_PROD is the abnormal production where the normal production is estimated using equation (1c) by 2 digit industry-year with at least 15 observations; AB_PROD ijt is PROD ijt minus Normal PROD ijt for firm i in industry j and year t.
AB_RD is the abnormal research and development expense where the normal research and development expense is estimated using equation (1a) by 2 digit industry-year with at least 15 observations; AB_RD ijt is RD ijt minus Normal RD ijt for firm i in industry j and year t.
AB_RM
is the abnormal real-activity based earnings management which is abnormal research and development expense (AB_RD) plus abnormal selling, general and administrative expense (AB_SGA) minus abnormal production (AB_PROD).
AB_SGA is the abnormal selling, general and administrative expense where the normal selling, general and administrative expense is estimated using equation (1b) by 2 digit industry-year with at least 15 observations; AB_SGA ijt is SGA ijt minus Normal SGA ijt for firm i in industry j and year t.
ADJ_CFO is the industry-adjusted cash flow from operations where the industry-year average cash flow from operations is estimated for every 2 digit industry-year as total cash flow from operations in t divided by total assets in t-1; ADJ_CFO ijt is CFO ijt minus industry-year CFO ijt for firm i in industry j and year t.
ADJ_ROA is the industry-adjusted return on assets where the industry-year average return on assets is estimated for every 2 digit industry-year as total income before extraordinary items in t divided by total assets in t-1; ADJ_ROA ijt is ROA ijt minus industry-year ROA ijt for firm i in industry j and year t.
ASSET is the total assets (AT).
BEAT is an indicator variable equal to 1 when net income (NI) divided by total assets (AT) is greater than or equal to 0.01, 0 otherwise. CFO is the cash flow from operations (OANCF) in t divided by the total assets (AT) in t-1. CH_SALE is the change in net sales (SALE). CUM_ROA is the cumulative return on assets which is the sum of ADJ_ROA for the years t+1, t+2 and t+3.
DECLINE
is an indicator variable equal to 1 when a firm is not in any of the stages (INTRO, GROWTH and MATURE), 0 otherwise. GROWTH is an indicator variable equal to 1 when operating cash flows (OANCF)>0 and investing cash flows (IVNCF)<0 and financing cash flows (FINCF)>0, 0 otherwise.
INCENTIVE
is an indicator variable equal to one when a firm has a merger or acquisition or it has raised debt or equity capital, 0 otherwise. A firm is defined to have raised capital when its long-term debt (DLTT) has increased by at least 20% or its common shares outstanding (CSHO) have increased by at least 10%.
INT is the internal funds in t divided by total assets (AT) in t-1 where the internal funds is income before extraordinary items (IB) plus depreciation (DP) plus research and development expense (XRD). MKT_VAL is the market value of equity computed as common shares outstanding (CSHO) multiplied by the fiscal-year end stock price (PRCC_F). MTB is the market value of equity (MKT_VAL) divided by the book value of equity (CEQ). NEG is an indicator variable equal to 1 when CH_SALE is less than zero, 0 otherwise. PROD is the production expense in t divided by the total assets (AT) in t-1 where production expense is the cost of goods sold (COGS) plus the change in inventory (INVT). RD is the research and development expense (XRD) in t divided by the total assets (AT) in t-1.
RETURN
is the size-adjusted abnormal stock returns computed as the difference in buy and hold returns for the firm and size matched decile portfolio where buy and hold returns for the firm are monthly returns (TRT1M) compounded over 12 months of the fiscal year. RM is an indicator variable equal to 1 when AB_RM is in the lowest quintile, 0 otherwise.
ROA is the return on assets computed as the income before extraordinary items (IB) in t divided by the total assets (AT) in t-1. SALE is the net sales (SALE). SGA Selling, general and administrative expense (XSGA) in t divided by the total assets (AT) in t-1.
TOBIN'S_Q
is the Tobin's Q computed as the sum of market value of equity (MKT_VAL), preferred stock (PSTK), long-term debt (DLTT) and debt in current liabilities (DLC) divided by the total assets (AT).
ZSCORE is a measure of financial health computed using a variant of Altman's (1968) Z-Score ((3.3*NI t /AT t-1 )+(1.0*SALE t /AT t-1 )+(1.4*RE t /AT t-1 )+((1.2*(ACT t -LCT t )/AT t-1 )).
Appendix B Estimation of real-activity based earnings management measures
To estimate equation (1a) we use all available observations in the Compustat database with nonmissing R&D expenses from years 1987 to 2014 for each industry-year. The number of firm-year observations for the estimation is 87,186, representing 554 industry-years. The mean of the industry-year estimates is provided below the variable and the t-statistic based on the mean is in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote p-values at 10%, 5% and 1% for a two-tailed test. -3.561) (21.082) (-6.331) The mean adjusted R 2 of the industry-year estimations is 60.9%. To estimate equation (1c) we use all available observations in the Compustat database with nonmissing production expenses from years 1987 to 2014 for each industry-year. The number of firm-year observations used in the estimation is 147,187, representing 1,237 industry-years. The mean of the industry-year estimates is provided below the variable and the t-statistic based on the mean is in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote p-values at 10%, 5% and 1% for a two-tailed test.
RD
-0.057*** 0.084 0.000 -0.049*** (-9.744) (0.515) (0.063) (-19.106) (-0.710) The mean adjusted R 2 of the industry-year estimations is 90.0%.
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Page No. 41 (-8.936 ) Log(ASSET t ) -0.034*** -0.042*** -0.049*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.027*** -0.042*** -0.048*** -0.033*** -0.028*** (-12.456 ) (-9.193 ) (-13 .959) (-12 .109) (-8.384 ) (-11 .074) (-8.978 ) (-14 .042) (-12 .370) (-7 (-8.935 ) (-0 .370) (-5.085 ) (-4 .903) (-1.105 ) (-6 .958) (0.687) (-4.703 ) (-4 .893) (-0 (-4 .042) (-4 .040) (0.114) (-5 .309) (-10 .648) (-4 .268) (-3 .665) (0.212) (-6 .234) RM t -0.031*** -0.036*** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.041*** (-12.573 ) (-4 .084) (-6 .900) (-7 .562) (-2.614 ) (-11.643 ) (-5 .050) (-5.499 ) (-7 .393) (-7 (-7 .541) (-0 .397) (-2.746 ) (-6 .982) (-1.065 ) (-7 .814) (-1.025 ) (-2.694 ) (-6 .805) (-1.538 (-0 .158) (-1.694 ) (-4.916 ) (-0.755 ) (-5 .075) (-3.101 ) (-0 .622) (-2.909 ) (-4.202 (-6 .385) (-1.057 ) (-3.958 ) (-1.309 ) (-2.624 ) (-7 .683) (-2.128 ) (-1.987 ) (-1.398 ) (-4 .058) MISS t -0.126*** -0.020 -0.032 -0.006 -0.148*** -0.121*** -0.066*** -0.019 -0.006 -0.081*** (-8.312 ) (-0 .872) (-1.493 ) (-0.135 ) (-5.910 ) (-12 .708) (-2.606 ) (-0 .632) (-0.286 ) (-4.734 Table 5 Equation (2): AB_RM t = α + β 1 J_BEAT t + β 2 J_MISS t + β 3 MISS t + β 4 Log(ASSET t ) + β 5 MTB t + β 6 ROA t + Industry F.E. + Year F. E. + error.
